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ABSTRACT
Understanding social interaction within groups is key to analyz-
ing online communities. Most current work focuses on structural
properties: who talks to whom, and how such interactions form
larger network structures. The interactions themselves, however,
generally take place in the form of natural language — either spo-
ken or written — and one could reasonably suppose that signals
manifested in language might also provide information about roles,
status, and other aspects of the group’s dynamics. To date, how-
ever, finding domain-independent language-based signals has been
a challenge.
Here, we show that in group discussions, power differentials be-
tween participants are subtly revealed by how much one individual
immediately echoes the linguistic style of the person they are re-
sponding to. Starting from this observation, we propose an anal-
ysis framework based on linguistic coordination that can be used
to shed light on power relationships and that works consistently
across multiple types of power — including a more “static” form
of power based on status differences, and a more “situational” form
of power in which one individual experiences a type of dependence
on another. Using this framework, we study how conversational
behavior can reveal power relationships in two very different set-
tings: discussions among Wikipedians and arguments before the
U. S. Supreme Court.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applica-
tions]: Social and behavioral sciences
General Terms: Measurement, Experimentation
Keywords power, relations, dependence, social status, linguistic
style, coordination, linguistic convergence, language, online com-
munities, dependence, accommodation
1. INTRODUCTION
With the arrival of detailed data on the interactions within social
groups — generally coming from the on-line domain — an active
line of research has developed around the phenomena taking place
in these groups. To date, these analyses have mainly used structural
features of the interactions, including who talks to whom, how fre-
quently, and how these patterns of interaction form larger network
structures.
But the interactions themselves are generally taking place in nat-
ural language — both spoken and written — and the language con-
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tent of these interactions has been a long-acknowledged missing
ingredient in this style of investigation. The reason for this is clear:
while it is reasonable to suppose that signals within the language
could provide insight into the social structure of the group, it has
been challenging to extract useful language-level signals. A small
but growing line of work has begun to use textual content for un-
covering structural properties of on-line networks [5, 9, 12, 13, 18,
19, 35, 40, 54]; it is exciting to contemplate extending the range of
social properties that can be analyzed via text.
Power and linguistic style. In this paper, we show how variations
in linguistic style can provide information about power differences
within social groups. Our focus is on domains in which groups en-
gage in goal-oriented discussions — situations where people inter-
act, not necessarily collaboratively, in order to accomplish tasks or
settle on choices. An important characteristic of such discussions is
that the participants are invested in the issues at hand, so that their
dialogs are not simply “idle chat”, but consequential: the outcome
matters. Examples include conversations among wiki editors or
open-source teams regarding modifications; debates within confer-
ence program committees on which papers to accept; and discus-
sions in legal hearings, where opposing sides compete to persuade
a judge or jury.
Power differences among the participants constitute a crucial
force in all these settings. Sometimes these power differences are
embodied in formal roles, such as that of a judge or a program chair.
Sometimes they are based on more informal differences in the re-
spect or authority commanded by individuals within the group.
And sometimes they are more situational: x may have power over
y in a given situation because y needs something that x can choose
to provide or not.
It is natural to ask how we might try to create widely-applicable
methods for inferring these power differences simply by observa-
tion of the language used within a group. This is particularly chal-
lenging if we are seeking methods that generalize across domains,
and are not tied to specific choices of content. By way of analogy,
imagine that you walk into a meeting among people you’ve never
met, and on a topic that you know nothing about; what could you
do to identify who are the most powerful members of the group? If
you were actually able to observe the people and hear them speak-
ing to each other, then cues such as posture and vocal pitch can
provide such information [20, 27]. But if we only have the text or
transcripts of their interactions — the formats that online data often
takes — how do we identify evidence of power differences?
Language coordination. We propose that language coordination
in text content alone can serve as a rich source of information about
power differences within a group. Language coordination is a phe-
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nomenon in which people tend to unconsciously mimic the choices
of function-word classes made by the people they are communi-
cating with [39]; roughly speaking, if you are communicating with
someone who uses a lot of articles — or prepositions, or personal
pronouns — then you will tend to increase your usage of these
types of words as well, even if you don’t consciously realize it.1
We measure language coordination in two datasets of goal-oriented
text that arise in very different settings: discussions among Wikipedia
editors, containing over 240,000 conversational exchanges; and oral
arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, as processed by Hawes
et al. [24, 25] and containing 50,389 conversational exchanges
among Justices and lawyers. By focusing on function word classes,
rather than domain-specific substantive content, we are able to eval-
uate the domain-independence of our techniques and their ability to
generalize across different contexts; methods that rely on subject-
specific cues to determine levels of power (such as the use of “Your
honor” in a legal setting) are not positioned to generalize as readily.
To be able to speak in a principled way about power differences,
we draw on the framework of exchange theory from sociology [51].
Exchange theory and its generalizations [49] have distinguished be-
tween two forms of power, which naturally parallel the types of
power in our discussion above. First, a power difference between
x and y can be based on the fact that x has higher status than y, ei-
ther through a formal designation of status, or through more infor-
mal notions of status based on reputation within the group. Second,
a power difference can also arise through dependence: if y needs
something from x, and hence is dependent on x, this can give x a
form of at least temporary power over y.
Power differences from language coordination. We find that dif-
ferences in the level of language coordination consistently reveal
both of these types of power differences, in both of our datasets.
Specifically, we will present the following results.
1. In general, people with low power exhibit greater language
coordination than people with high power.
2. Conversely, people coordinate more with interlocutors who
have higher power than with those who have lower power.
3. When a person undergoes a change in status, their coordina-
tion behavior changes, and so does the coordination behavior
of people talking to them.
4. When an individual is trying to convince someone who holds
an opposing view, this creates a form of dependence and
hence a power deficit in the sense of exchange theory; we
find increased levels of language coordination in such cases.
5. The relation between status level and the extent of language
coordination transfers across domains, and is a reliable cross-
domain feature for status prediction.
These results suggest clear potential applications to the analysis
of on-line social groups. In particular, they could provide meth-
ods for identifying power differences and levels of status in on-line
settings where one has only the text content of social interactions,
rather than explicit markers of status or explicitly annotated links.
Similarly, they could also provide a means of analyzing conversa-
tions between users of a social media platform so as to determine
the power balance or levels of relative status in their relationship.
1We note that language coordination is just one form of coordina-
tion where such phenomena occur [21] (another is posture coordi-
nation, for example); we focus on language coordination because it
can be measured in textual interactions.
In all such uses, the methods do not require domain-specific knowl-
edge of the on-line application being analyzed. We also note that
the role of features internal to the content can be crucial in some of
these settings, since it has been observed that message frequency
and message volume do not necessarily suffice to determine relative
status. As Rowe et al. state [42], “As we move down the corporate
ladder, the conversational flows of dissimilar employees can in fact
be quite similar.” Indeed, it is easy to think of contexts where dom-
inant individuals consume a lot of the conversational bandwidth,
and others where, contrariwise, low-status individual take up most
of the airtime with their advocacy toward higher-status participants.
There is something striking about the fact that the content fea-
tures being employed are properties of language that tend to escape
conscious attention. The phenomena we find in the text content are
consistent and significant, but they are not effects one notices in
reading or listening to the interactions; in essence, they operate on
levels that only show up when you use computational methods to
explicitly tune in to them. Moreover, since our methods are based
on function words, it means one can apply them to language sam-
ples from which the content words have been redacted, raising in-
triguing implications for compact representations and user privacy.
Summary: Novel contributions of present work. Our use of lan-
guage coordination as a key source of information draws on a his-
tory of coordination studies originating in social psychology; we
discuss this background in §2. These psychological studies of co-
ordination focused on small-scale settings where participant behav-
iors could be individually observed; the identification of language
coordination phenomena in large-scale on-line text was done re-
cently by [10] using data from Twitter. To our knowledge, our work
is the first to identify connections between language coordination
and social power relations at large scales, and across a diverse set
of individuals and domains.
In addition, our work here provides the following further novel
contributions.
Multiple domains with large amounts of data. By using large
amounts of data, we can pick up subtle effects and explicitly vary
some of the underlying conditions for coordination across differ-
ent subsets of the data. Moreover, working with two different cor-
pora allows us to test the domain independence of our linguistic-
coordination approach.
Status change. Wikipedians can be promoted to administrator
status through a public election, and almost always after extensive
prior involvement in the community. Since we track the communi-
cations of editors over time, we can examine how linguistic coordi-
nation behavior changes when a Wikipedian becomes an “admin”.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the effects of
status change on specific forms of language use.
Situation-dependent forms of power. By generalizing from status
to broader notions of power, our study is, to our knowledge, also
the first to show how multiple types of power relationships — and
in particular situation-dependent power — can be exposed through
domain-independent textual features.
2. COORDINATION AND POWER
We can apply communication accommodation theory [20, 21,
38, 45], an influential line of research in sociolinguistics, to our
investigations because the theory implies the following principle:
Principle P . Linguistic coordination is a function of the power
differential between the speaker and the target: the lower the
power of the speaker relative to that of the target, the more
she coordinates (and vice versa, the higher the relative power
of the speaker, the less she coordinates).
Here and throughout, speaker refers to the person producing the
reply in an exchange, and target refers to the person initiating the
exchange (and thus the target of the speaker’s reply). 2 In the con-
text of group conversations, which is the focus of the present work,
this principle leads to the following two concrete hypotheses, based
on the power of the target and of the speaker, respectively:
Ptarget: People in general coordinate more towards high-powered
people than towards low-powered people.
Pspeaker: High-powered people coordinate less than low-powered
people towards their targets.
(Neither hypothesis implies the other because we employ an asym-
metric definition of coordination.)
In addition to power imbalance, we hypothesize that personal
traits of the participants also influence how much they coordinate:
B. People have a baseline coordination level, which is determined
by personal characteristics (such as their sociability and level
of social engagement).
It is worth noting that it is not actually a priori obvious that
Ptarget and Pspeaker hold at large. First, there are competing the-
ories which postulate that the relation between power and coordi-
nation is the reverse of P , due to a desire of high-status individuals
to be understood [2]. Second, empirical studies supporting the hy-
potheses above are, while intriguing, relatively small in scale. For
example, [22] showed that Larry King, the host of a popular talk-
show in the U. S., coordinated more in his vocal pitch to his high-
status guests (such as then-President Clinton) than to low-status
guests. As for linguistic style coordination, [39] looked at 15 Wa-
tergate transcripts involving only four people altogether (Richard
Nixon and three of his aides); small numbers of courtroom trials
have also been considered [1, 15].
While power might correlate with certain personal traits in a
given community, making the distinction between P and B diffi-
cult, they differ in one important aspect which we will exploit in
our study: power can change abruptly — such as when an indi-
vidual is assigned a new role — while personal traits, in compar-
ison, are more stable over time. As a result, examining the tem-
poral change in coordination level of people who have undergone
changes in power can help us isolate the effect of P from that of
B. In particular, this will help us address the following question: if
we do find evidence supporting hypothesis B, would it be sufficient
to explain the data, or will we see power playing a role on top of
baseline individual coordination levels?
3. POWER RELATIONS IN WIKIPEDIA AND
SUPREME COURT DATA
In this section, we describe the two corpora of consequential dis-
cussions we used in our studies. The first consists of discussions
between editors on Wikipedia; the second consists of transcripts
of oral arguments before the United States Supreme Court. Both
settings involve power differentials, both through status and de-
pendence, as we will see below. Our Wikipedia corpus is much
larger, potentially more representative of online discussions, and
allows us to study the effects of changes in power; but the Supreme
2 We use “initiate” and “reply” loosely: in our terminology, the
conversation 〈x: “Hi.” y: “Tired?” x: “No.”〉 has two exchanges,
one initiated by x’s “Hi”, the other by y’s “Tired?”.
Court represents a less collaborative situation than Wikipedia (in
the Supreme Court data, there are always explicit opposing sides)
and is an instance of an off-line setting. The differences in the
two corpora help us focus on general, domain-independent rela-
tionships between relative power and linguistic coordination.
We begin by briefly describing the roles and text content of our
two domains, and then discuss how we formalize the different kinds
of power imbalances within the domains.
We will release our data publicly at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/
~cristian/www2012/.
3.1 Discussions among Wikipedia editors
Roles and role changes. Wikipedia editors form a close com-
munity with salient markers of status. Administrators, commonly
known as admins, are Wikipedia editors “trusted with access to re-
stricted technical features” such as protecting or deleting pages or
blocking other editors3. In effect, admins have a higher status than
other users (non-admins) in the Wikipedia community, and editors
seem to be well aware of the status and activity history of other ed-
itors. Users are promoted to admins through a transparent election
process known as requests for adminship4, or RfAs, where the com-
munity decides who will become admins. Since RfAs are well doc-
umented and timestamped, not only do we have the current status of
editors, we can also extract the exact time when editors underwent
role changes from non-admins to admins.
Textual exchanges. Editors on Wikipedia interact on talk pages5
to discuss changes to article or project pages. We gathered 240,436
conversational exchanges carried out on the talk pages, where the
participants of these (asynchronous) discussions were associated
with rich status and social interaction information: status, times-
tamp of status change if there is one, and activity level on talk
pages, which can serve as a proxy of editors’ sociability, or how
socially inclined they are. In addition, there is a discussion phase
during RfAs, where users “give their opinions, ask questions, and
make comments” about an open nomination. Candidates can reply
to existing posts during this time. We extracted conversations that
occurred in RfA discussions, and obtained a total of 32,000 conver-
sational exchanges. Most of our experiments were carried out on
the larger dataset extracted from talk pages, unless otherwise noted.
3.2 Supreme Court oral arguments
While Wikipedia discussions provide a large-scale dataset with
rich meta-information, overall, high-status people and low-status
people are collaborating to accomplish a task. Other social hierar-
chies involve much less collaboration or even explicitly adversarial
relationships. Oral arguments before the Supreme Court provide
such a setting.
Roles. A full court consists of nine Justices, although occasionally
some recuse themselves. In the oral arguments for a case, lawyers
for each party have thirty minutes to present their side to the Jus-
tices. The Justices may interrupt these presentations with com-
ments or questions, leading to interactions between the lawyers
(plus amici curiae, who for our status-based investigations count
as lawyers) and Justices. After the oral arguments and subsequent
deliberations, cases are decided by majority vote of the Justices.
This provides an interesting additional test ground: instead of asyn-
chronous textual exchanges in a social hierarchy working collabo-
ratively, here we have verbal exchanges in a social hierarchy where
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_adminship
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Talk_page_guidelines
Wikipedia
higher power lower power
Status admins non-adminsadmins admins-to-be (before RfAs)
Dependence diff. vote same vote
Supreme Court
higher power lower power
Status Justices lawyersChief Justices Associate Justices
Dependence unfavorable Justice favorable Justice
Table 1: Power differentials exhibited in our data.
Justices decide the final outcome. In addition, conversations here
are over topics in a completely different domain.
Transcripts of verbal exchanges. Transcripts of oral arguments
in Supreme Court are publicly available6. We used a pre-processed
version of this dataset described in [24]. We enhanced this dataset
with the final votes from the Spaeth Supreme Court database7. In
total, we have 50,389 verbal exchanges for 204 cases. 11 justices
(two of which have little conversational data: Thomas8 and Al-
ito) and 311 lawyers are represented in the dataset. 73% of the
lawyers only appear in one case, and the maximum number of cases
where one lawyer appears is 15. As such, trends identified on this
dataset should not be due to idiosyncratic behavior of a few over-
represented lawyers.
3.3 Power Relations in the Data
Having now surveyed the nature of the two domains, we dis-
cuss the different kinds of power relations that they contain. An
overview of the following discussion is summarized in Table 1.9
In our discussion of roles earlier in this section, we have already
indicated some of the basic status differences: the distinction be-
tween admins and non-admins on Wikipedia, and the distinction
between Justices and lawyers in the context of the Supreme Court.
We can also identify certain finer-grained distinctions, including
the distinction between the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (our
data overlaps the terms of two different Chief Justices) and the As-
sociate Justices. And on Wikipedia, we can also study the behavior
over time of users who were promoted to the position of admin —
in effect, comparing their behavior as admins to their earlier behav-
ior as admins-to-be.
Our data also makes it possible to study several instances of
power differences based on dependence. To begin with, we note
the general principle that status and dependence are almost never
completely distinct [48], since a person in a high-status role fre-
quently appears in situations where people are dependent on them.
The data, however, offers us opportunities to study forms of de-
pendence where the level of status has been largely controlled for.
Key among these are forms of dependence created by the need to
convince someone who disagrees with you. If you are advocating a
position in a debate with opposing sides leading to an eventual de-
6http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
7http://scdb.wustl.edu/
8In 2011, Justice Thomas marked five terms without speaking in
any oral arguments. [34]
9Throughout the paper we use color coding to indicate the relative
power relations relevant for the respective discussion. These col-
ors are simply intended as a helpful mnemonic and can be ignored
without any loss of meaning.
cision (for example, a Supreme Court case, or a policy discussion
on Wikipedia prior to a vote), then your audience can be roughly
divided into two groups: people who would naturally tend to vote
in favor of your position, and people who would naturally tend to
vote against your position. Principles of exchange theory indicate
that in such situations, you are more dependent on the people who
would naturally vote against you, and less dependent on the people
who would naturally vote for you, since in order to accomplish your
goal, you need to effect a more substantial behavior change in the
former group [14, 30, 52]. An important further point here is that
in our settings, participants can readily anticipate, either through
dialogue or advance knowledge, who is “on their side” and who is
“on the other side,” and so it makes sense to suppose that they are
aware of these dependence relations during the interaction.
Motivated by this, in the Supreme Court data we will compare
levels of coordination of lawyers toward unfavorable Justices who
(eventually) vote against their side and toward favorable Justices
who (eventually) vote for their side; there is more dependence and
hence more of a power difference in the former case. In the Wikipedia
data, we will compare levels of coordination of editors with others
who vote the opposite way and with others who vote the same way;
here too, there is more dependence and hence more of a power
difference in the former case. We should also note the exchange-
theoretic principle that a dependence relation affects both sides:
A’s dependence on B is expected not just to affect A’s behavior in
their interaction, but B’s as well.
4. LINGUISTIC STYLE COORDINATION
As discussed earlier, we use linguistic style coordination to quan-
tify the degree to which one individual immediately echoes the lin-
guistic style of the person they are responding to. Here, linguistic
style is quantified by a person’s usage of certain linguistic style
markers (= categories of function words). We first describe these
markers, then give formal definitions of coordination.
4.1 Linguistic style markers
We measure the linguistic style of a person by their usage of cate-
gories of function words that have little semantic meaning, thereby
marking style rather than content.
For consistency with prior work, we employed eight of the nine
LIWC-derived categories [41] deemed to be processed by humans
in a generally non-conscious fashion [28]. Our eight markers are
thus: articles, auxiliary verbs, conjunctions, high-frequency ad-
verbs, impersonal pronouns, personal pronouns, prepositions, and
quantifiers (451 lexemes total).10
4.2 Coordination measures
Here we present a variation and further analysis of the measure
introduced in [10], adapted to the setting of group conversations.
Coordination with respect to a marker. We start by defining
the coordination of one person b towards another person a with
respect to a specific linguistic style marker m. We want to quantify
how much the use of marker class m in an utterance of a’s triggers
the occurrence of m in b’s immediate (meaning next) reply to that
utterance. To put it another way, we want to measure how much a’s
use of m in an utterance u1 increases the probability that b will use
m in his reply u2, where the increase is relative to b’s normal usage
of m in conversations with a. We stress that we are thus looking at
a more subtle phenomenon than whether b uses articles (say) more
10 We discarded negation because it is sparse and seems to carry
semantic meaning. [28] also discarded some negations.
overall when talking to a: we want to see whether b is so influenced
by a as to change their function-word usage in their very next reply.
Recall from §2 that we call b the speaker and a the target of a
conversational exchange (a : u1, b : u2), since a is the target of b’s
reply when b speaks. We say an utterance exhibitsm if it contains
a word from category m. Let Emu1 be the event that utterance u1
(spoken to b) exhibits m; similarly, let Emu2↪→u1 be the event that
reply u2 to u1 exhibits m.
Given a set Sa,b of exchanges (a : u1, b : u2), we define the
coordination of b towards a as:
Cm(b, a) = P (Emu2↪→u1 | Emu1)− P (Emu2↪→u1), (1)
where the probabilities are estimated over Sa,b, and where we re-
quire that at least one of a’s utterances exhibits m in order for the
first quantity to be defined.
Properties. Eqn. (1) has several interesting properties. One non-
obvious but important and useful characteristic is that it is a func-
tion not only of b’s behavior, but also of a’s, because it can be
shown that (1) lies in the interval [− (1− P (Emu1)) , 1− P (Emu1)].
To see why a’s behavior needs to be taken into account, consider
one extreme case: where every utterance of a to b exhibitsm. Then
Cm(b, a) = 0 no matter what b does in response, which makes
sense because we have no evidence that any (or no) usage of articles
by b is done in response to what a does — we don’t have any test
cases to see what b does when a doesn’t employ a marker.
Another extreme case is also illustrative: where a uses m only a
few times when speaking to b, and b uses m when and only when
a does. Then, Cm(b, a) approaches 1 as P (Emu1) approaches zero.
Again, this makes intuitive sense: it is very unlikely that bmatching
a exactly on the few times a used m is due merely to chance.
Another property of measure (1) is that it is not symmetric, which
fits the purpose of this study well, since the power relations we want
to investigate are also asymmetric. See [11] for further discussion
on the asymmetry.
Coordination towards a group. In the context of group conver-
sations, we can extend this definition to coordination of a particular
speaker b towards a group of targets A by simply modifying the
set of exchanges on which the probabilities in (1) are estimated.
Specifically, given a set SA,b of exchanges (a : u1, b : u2) involv-
ing initial utterances u1 of various targets a ∈ A and replies u2 of
b, the coordination of b to the group A is:
Cm(b, A) = P (Emu2↪→u1 | Emu1)− P (Emu2↪→u1), (2)
but where this time the probabilities are estimated over SA,b.
We then define the coordination of one group of people B to-
wards another group A as the average coordination of speakers in
B to targets in A:
Cm(B,A) = 〈Cm(b, A)〉b∈B (3)
By taking the macro (unweighted) average, our measure will not be
dominated by a few active speakers in a dataset.
Aggregated measures. It is important to note that in general,
coordination is multimodal: it does not necessarily occur simulta-
neously for all markers [17], and speakers may coordinate on some
features but diverge on others [47]. Hence, we also use aggregated
measures of coordination of B to A to provide an overall picture of
the level of coordination between the groups.
Ideally we want to simply computeC(b, A) as the macro-average
ofCm(b, A) across different markersm, and then computeC(B,A)
the same way as in (3). Recall, however, that Cm(b, A) can only
be computed if SA,b contains enough exchanges exhibiting m to
reliably estimate both probabilities in (2), which is not always the
case for all people with respect to all markers. For instance, some
persons rarely use quantifiers, leaving Cquant undefined in those
instances.
We accounted for such “missing values” in three different ways,
resulting in three aggregated measures:
Aggregated 1 Compute the “ideal” macro-average C(b, A) only
for the persons b for whom Cm(b, A) can be computed for
all markers; ignore all the others. This reduces the set of
persons considered by the aggregated measure, but provides
the most direct measure (in the sense that it does not rely
on any particular “smoothing” assumptions as the next two
aggregated measures do).
Aggregated 2 For each person b, if Cm(b, A) is undefined, we
“smooth” it by using the group average Cm(B,A) instead;
this measure considers everybody for which we can compute
coordination for at least one marker, but assumes that people
in a given group share similar coordination behavior.
Aggregated 3 For each person b, we take the average only over the
markers for which Cm(b, A) is defined; this is equivalent to
assuming that b would have exhibited the same level of coor-
dination for the missing markers as they did with other mark-
ers. This aggregation also considers everybody for which we
can compute coordination for at least one marker.
4.3 Formalization of the power hypotheses
Now that we have introduced a more formal definition of coordi-
nation between two groups of people, we formalize the hypotheses
introduced in §2 in terms of this definition. If people in a group
Ghigh have more power than people in a group Glow, and U is a
set of arbitrary people, the power hypotheses can be rewritten as:
Ptarget: C(U,Ghigh) > C(U,Glow)
Pspeaker: C(Ghigh, U) < C(Glow, U)
5. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Using the concepts and formalism introduced in the previous
sections, we can now investigate the relation between linguistic co-
ordination and power differentials in concrete conversational set-
tings. Specifically, we test whether the principle P and the hy-
potheses Ptarget and Pspeaker introduced in §2 can be empirically
confirmed in the two datasets described in §3. We begin by dis-
cussing power differences arising from status in Wikipedia (where
our primary status distinction will be admins vs. non-admins) and
in the Supreme Court (where our primary status distinction will be
Justices vs. lawyers). After this, we consider power differences
arising from dependence.
5.1 Power from status: Wikipedia
First, communication behavior on Wikipedia provides evidence
for hypothesis Ptarget: users coordinate more toward the (higher-
powered) admins than toward the non-admins (Figure 1(a)).11
In the other direction, however, when comparing admins and
non-admins as speakers, the data provides evidence that is initially
11 The major explanatory factor for these results does not appear to
be wholesale repetition of phrases, even short ones. We note, for
example, that with respect to the data used for computing conjunc-
tion coordination, only 0.7% of the exchanges contain trigram re-
peats involving conjunctions and only 3.5% contain bigram repeats
involving conjunctions; and the difference in coordination levels re-
mains significant when exchanges with such repeats are discarded.
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(b) Contradicting Pspeaker
Figure 1: Status and linguistic coordination: (a) Users coordi-
nate more towards admins (high-powered) than towards non-
admins (low-powered), supporting hypothesis Ptarget (indeed,
significantly so in aggregate: see later part of this caption).
(b) On the other hand, admins (high-powered) coordinate more
than non-admins (low-powered) when replying to other people,
contradicting hypothesis Pspeaker .
Note on all figures: ∗’s on the x-axis (e.g., “Article*”
in (a)) indicate statistical significance, independent t-test:
*=“p<0.05”,**=“p<0.01”,***=“p<0.001”. Next to each legend
label, in parentheses, are: the number of users for Aggregated
1 (i.e., the users for which we can compute coordination for all
markers) and the total number of users for Aggregated 2 and
3 (i.e., the users for which we can compute coordination for at
least one marker). “Error bars” do not indicate standard er-
ror (we already marked statistical significance with stars) but
rather give an idea of how coordination values vary via the
standard deviation, estimated by bootstrap resampling [29].
The y-axis values are reported as percentages (i.e., multiplied
by 100) for clarity.
at odds with Pspeaker: as illustrated in Figure 1(b), admins coordi-
nate to other people more than non-admins do (while the hypothesis
predicted that they would coordinate less).12 We now explore some
of the subtleties underlying this result, showing how it arises as a
superposition of two effects.
Personal characteristics: Hypothesis B. One possible explana-
tion for the inconsistency of our observations with Pspeaker is the
effect of personal characteristics suggested in Hypothesis B from
§2. Specifically, admin status was not conferred arbitrarily on a set
of users; rather, admins are those people who sought out this higher
status and succeeded in achieving it. It is thus natural to suppose
that, as a group, they may have distinguishing individual traits that
are reflected in their level of language coordination.
Fortunately we can extract rich enough data from Wikipedia that
it becomes possible, to a significant extent, to separate the effect
of status from these individual traits, establishing that both effects
play a role. Our separation of these effects is based on the fact that
status can change abruptly, while personal characteristics, though
mutable, are more stable over time. On Wikipedia, status changes
12 Note that the observations shown in Figure 1(a) do not imply
those in Figure 1(b), nor vice-versa. For example, the trend in Fig-
ure 1(a) does not change if we restrict the speakers to be only non-
admins (or only admins).
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(b) In RfA discussions (B)
Figure 2: Same-status comparisons (supporting a “winner”
personality hypothesis): (a) admins-to-be coordinate more
than those who remain non-admins thoughout; (b) during ad-
minship elections (RfAs), admins-to-be coordinate more than
failed-to-be.
are well documented, as they can occur only through an election
process instigated by requests for adminship (RfAs). When we
compare the set of admins-to-be— future admins before they were
promoted via their RfA — with non-admins, Figure 2(a) shows that
the same differences in language coordination were already present
in these two populations — hence, they are not an effect of status
alone, since they were visible before the former population experi-
enced a status upgrade.
Can we separate the effects of ambition from success? Yes, be-
cause we can look at differences in coordination between users
who were promoted (admins-to-be), and those who went through
the RfA process but were denied admin status (failed-to-be). Both
admins-to-be and failed-to-be had the ambition to become admins,
but only members of the former group succeeded. We investigate
coordination differnces between these two groups during a period
when their adminship ambitions are arguably most salient: during
the discussions in each user’s own RfA process. Figure 2(b) shows
that even in the conversations they had on their RfA pages, the
admins-to-be were coordinating more to the others than the failed-
to-be, providing evidence for a strong form of Hypothesis B.
Revisiting status: Hypothesis P ′speaker . We now return to the
issue of status, and describe a method of partially controlling for
personal characteristics so as to evaluate the following modification
of Hypothesis Pspeaker:
P ′speaker . When controlling for personal characteristics, high-
powered people coordinate less than low-powered people.
To study P ′speaker , we create two populations for comparison:
the interactions of each admin before his or her promotion via RfA
(i.e., when they were admins-to-be), and the interactions of each
admin after his or her respective promotion. Figure 3(a) shows
how the resulting comparison confirmsP ′speaker: admins-to-be de-
crease their level of coordination once they gain power.13 Interest-
ingly, the reverse seems to be true for failed-to-be: after failing
13Note that the trend shown in Figure 3(a) is maintained when con-
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Figure 3: Effect of status change. (a) admins-to-be coordinate
less after they become admins; (b) Aggregated 1 coordination
of the user (as speaker) and, respectively, towards the user (as
target) before and after status change occurs through RfA.
in their RfAs — an event that arguably reinforces their failure to
achieve high status in the community — they coordinate more (
p-value < 0.05; figure omitted due to space limitations).
In addition, we can employ status change to reinforce Ptarget
in a setting that controls for personal characteristics: we find that
users coordinate more to admins after promotion than when they
were admins-to-be (p-value<0.05).
Finally, in Figure 3(b), we investigate how quickly the change
in status is reflected in the communication behavior of the users
involved. In addition to the monotonic changes in coordination
levels over time, and in the hypothesized directions, it is interesting
to note that the most dramatic change in coordination is visible in
the second month after the change in status occurred. This suggests
a period of acclimation to the newly gained status, both for the
person that undergoes the change and for those witnessing it.
5.2 Power from status: Supreme Court
In the setting of the Supreme Court, status differences are ex-
tremely salient and do not suffer from the correlations that added
complexity to the study of Pspeaker in its original form. Also, con-
versations during the oral arguments (almost) always are between a
Justice and a lawyer. Thus, our basic finding can be expressed suc-
cinctly in Figure 4, which shows significantly more coordination
from lawyers to Justices than vice versa.14.
In the Supreme Court setting we can also study finer-grained sta-
tus distinctions, to see if these too are manifested in language coor-
dination differences. Indeed, in concordance with Ptarget, we ob-
serve that lawyers coordinate significantly more toward the Chief
Justice than toward the Associate Justices (p-value<0.01).
sidering the exact same users in both groups (i.e., excluding the
users which did not have enough conversations both before and af-
ter adminship). Also note that we allow a time buffer of a month
after the RfAs between the two sets of conversations we compare.
14 Throughout, we consider each appearance of a given Justice or
lawyer in a different case as a separate entity, which allows for
different behaviors in different cases and increases the number of
datapoints.
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Figure 4: Lawyers coordinate more to Justices than con-
versely.
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(b) Dependence: Pspeaker
Figure 5: Dependence and linguistic coordination: (a) lawyers
adjust their coordination level according to whether the Justice
is unfavorable or favorable, supporting Ptarget; (b) favorable
Justices coordinate more than unfavorable Justices (Pspeaker).
5.3 Power from dependence
As noted in §3, we can study power differences based on de-
pendence — even for fixed levels of status difference — using
the exchange-theoretic principle that the need to convince someone
who disagrees with you creates a form of dependence [14, 30, 52].
Moreover, this power difference is predicted to be felt by both sides
— the side with lower power and the side with higher power.
In the case of lawyer-Justice interactions, let us define the Jus-
tice to be favorable to the lawyer if he or she ends up voting on the
lawyer’s side, and unfavorable if he or she ends up voting against
the lawyer’s side. It is well understood that the Justices often come
into the case with a general leaning toward one side or the other
based on their judicial philosophy — this has been acknowledged
for example in interviews with members of the Court [43] — and
lawyers through their preparation for the case will come in with
knowledge of these leanings. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that
the favorable-unfavorable distinction will be salient to the interac-
tion during oral arguments.
And indeed, Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show that the power differ-
ences created by this form of dependence are reflected in the amount
of coordination, in both directions. First, lawyers coordinate more
toward unfavorable Justices (on whom they are more dependent)
than toward favorable Justices, in keeping with Ptarget. Second,
unfavorable Justices coordinate less toward lawyers than favorable
Justices do, in keeping with Pspeaker . Given the formal frame-
work of impartiality that characterizes the Justices’s behavior at the
Supreme Court, it is intriguing to see the undercurrent of language
coordination differences nevertheless hinting at their eventual deci-
sion.
We see a similar effect of dependence on coordination in the
context of discussions with opposing sides on Wikipedia. During
RfAs, one voter may try to change the opinion of voters on the
other side who have already cast their vote. (Changing your vote
during the RfA process is allowed, and hence there is an incentive
to convince voters to consider this.) Users coordinated more when
engaging with users on the opposite side than with those who voted
the same way (p-value<0.05; for space reasons we omit the figure).
This finding too, via the arguments about opposing sides and de-
pendence, supports the general power-coordination principle P .
6. CROSS-DOMAIN ANALYSIS AND INTER-
ACTION AMONG HYPOTHESES
6.1 Coordination as a Cross-Domain Feature
Part of the motivation for studying the relation between coor-
dination and power is that the principles that govern this relation
appear to be domain-independent. Here we perform a set of anal-
yses to show that coordination features do generalize across our
two domains more effectively than other text-based features for the
problem of inferring power. We find that indeed, compared to the
other features we consider, they are the only set of features to dis-
play any non-trivial generalization.
Our analysis is based on the following prediction task: for a
given pair of different-status people x and y who have engaged in
conversations with each other, we predict whether x has the higher
status. In this setting, a random guess baseline would achieve 50%
accuracy. We stress, however, that this prediction task is primarily
a means to assess cross-domain generalization, i.e., not as a free-
standing task in itself. Indeed, the best achievable performance on
this status-prediction task appears to be quite domain-dependent. In
some domains such as the Supreme Court, idiosyncratic cues in text
usage (e.g., lawyers begin their sentences with stylized lead-ins,
such as “Your honor”, that clearly mark them as lawyers, not Jus-
tices) enable almost perfect performance when these cues are avail-
able as features. In other domains, such as Wikipedia, an informal
evaluation using two human annotators familiar with the domain
produced only 70% accuracy (and an inter-annotator agreement of
only 80%). Thus, our interest is not in whether coordination fea-
tures achieve the best within-domain performance, but in whether
they are particularly effective at generalizing (as we indeed find
them to be).
Experimental setup. Let Rx be x’s replies to y, and Ry be y’s
replies to x, and Len(S) be the average length of all utterances in
the set S. Let Fstyle be the set of 8 stylistic markers introduced in
§4.1. We define the following sets of features used as input to an
SVM classifier:
• coordination features: binary features indicating, for each
m ∈ Fstyle as well as for Aggregated 115, whether x co-
ordinates more to y than y to x on m
15We only considered pairs of participants for which enough data
was available to compute coordination on all stylistic features.
in-domain cross-domain
Training corpus wiki court court wiki
Test corpus wiki court wiki court
coordination features (9 altogether) 57.7 70.4 57.1 55.0
stylistic features (18 altogether) 59.2 51.4 50.0 51.9
bag of words (20,000 altogether) 51.4 99.5 45.2 40.1
Table 2: Prediction accuracy for SVM’s using various feature
sets. Cross-domain results are in the right-hand two columns.
Bold = results significantly better than chance.
• stylistic features: frequency of each marker m ∈ Fstyle in
Rx and, respectively, in Ry; also, Len(Rx), Len(Ry). We
use this feature set to examine whether style alone is predic-
tive on its own, or whether specifically stylistic coordination
is key
• bag of words: frequency of each word in Rx, frequency of
each word in Ry , L2-normalized
For experiments on the Wikipedia data, which we denote as wiki,
we considered (admin, non-admin) pairs (for conversations occur-
ring after the admins were elected). For the Supreme Court dataset
(court), we considered (Justice, lawyer) pairs16.
For in-domain experiments, we report average accuracy over cross-
validation within the same domain (i.e., training and test corpora
are both wiki or court); for cross-domain experiments, we train on
one domain and test on the other.
Results. Table 2 summarizes the results. We find that coordi-
nation features are the only ones to perform statistically signifi-
cantly better than random guessing in the cross-domain settings —
the other classifiers simply learn cues that are idiosyncratic to their
training data, and fail to generalize. (Note for example that the bag-
of-words method picks up on the near-perfect lexical cues marking
lawyers in the Supreme Court data, but this method performs worse
than random guessing when applied to the other domain.)
Even looking at the in-domain tasks — which were not our pri-
mary focus here — we find that coordination features are the only
ones that perform statistically significantly better than random guess-
ing on both datasets.
6.2 Interactions among Hypotheses P and B
In §5 we saw that the interaction between personal characteris-
tics (which form the basis for Hypothesis B) and power differen-
tials (which form the basis for Hypothesis P) can lead to complex
effects. Here we consider two cases where this interaction raises
interesting issues, and point to open questions in the analysis of
coordination.
An individual’s level of social engagement is one type of per-
sonal characteristic that interacts with coordination and power. As
a simple proxy for social engagement, for purposes of discussion
here, we consider the volume of communication the individual en-
gages in. As we noted in §1, simple volume measures such as this
do not seem to readily yield domain-independent information about
power, since they vary considerably across domains — in some do-
mains the powerful people talk a lot, and in others they talk rel-
atively little. For example, when people are promoted to admin
status, their volume of communication goes up while (as we have
16In order to focus on the conversational exchanges and avoid ex-
changes in which the lawyers formally introduce their case, we
considered only cases where the length difference between the two
utterances were fewer than 20 words.
seen) their level of coordination goes down. On the other hand,
lawyers talk more than Justices in the Supreme Court data, and
(again as we have seen) they also coordinate more in the lawyer-
Justice interactions.
However, if we restrict attention to a fixed sub-population within
a given domain, there are interesting connections between coor-
dination and volume that suggest further questions. In particular,
on Wikipedia we consider the number of replies posted by a user
on talk-pages as a measure of communication volume, and hence a
proxy for their level of social engagement on the site. We compared
users in the top 1/3 of the sorted order by communication volume
with users in the bottom 1/3, finding that users with higher numbers
of replies are more likely to coordinate to others (p-value<0.05).
We observed the same effect when we compared the communica-
tion volumes of users with the same status: among admins, users
with more communication are also more likely to coordinate, and
the same trend holds among non-admins. Similar effects also hold
for other measures of communication volume. Again, we note that
other domains (such as the Supreme Court) show an inverse rela-
tion between volume and coordination in the communication tran-
scripts, and so it is an interesting question to identify the principles
that determine how this relationship plays out in different settings.
We also consider a second basic example that raises an interest-
ing challenge for distinguishing between Hypotheses P and B: the
effect of gender on coordination, using the fact that gender infor-
mation is available for participants in the Supreme Court dataset.
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Figure 6: Gender differences
The main finding here, in Figure 6, is that overall female lawyers
coordinate more than male lawyers when talking to Justices, and
correspondingly, Justices coordinate more towards male lawyers
than towards female lawyers. Given the extensive history of work
exploring culturally-embedded status and power differences based
on gender [3, 48], one interpretation of this finding is directly in
terms of Hypothesis P . However, since it is also potentially re-
lated to theories of gender-based communication differences [26]
and even gender-based language adaptation differences [40], the
question of separating Hypotheses P and B becomes challenging
here. We think it is a promising possibility that language coordina-
tion effects may be able to serve as a lens through which to measure
many similar kinds of distinctions in both on-line and off-line con-
versational settings.
7. FURTHER RELATED WORK
In the opening sections, we have discussed some of the ways in
which earlier work used text content to analyze on-line networks
[9, 12, 19, 35, 54], as well as background on language coordina-
tion and the exchange-theoretic notions of power from status and
dependence. Here we discuss some further work that is related to
the general issues we consider here.
Power and structural features. There has been extensive work
on using structural features, rather than language, to infer notions of
“importance” in networks, both in the literature on social networks
[16] and on the Web [8]. Recent work has also studied the inference
of status from on-line social network features [23, 33].
Power and language. The relation between linguistic coordi-
nation17 and status has mostly been examined in small-scale con-
texts: 15 Watergate transcripts [39], 40 courtroom cases [1], or a
single simulated courtroom trial [15]. A recent large-scale study of
language coordination in the on-line domain [10] used data from
Twitter, where markers of status and power are not as readily in-
ferred; they identified a weak correlation between language coordi-
nation and Twitter follower counts, suggesting a potential connec-
tion to status measures. Additionally, researchers have used text
features other than linguistic coordination to identify status differ-
ences [5, 13, 18, 37, 44]; in contrast with our work, these methods
picked up situation-specific cues, such as the word “termination”
for the Enron corporate-email corpus [13], which are unlikely to
generalize across contexts.
Collaborative communities. Interaction in online communities
has been extensively studied. Wikipedia was used as a testbed for
studying user interaction at large [4, 31, 36, 46, 50] and the promo-
tion process in such communities [7, 32]. Reviewer behavior and
incentives to participate in the collaborative process were studied
in the context of commercial review sites [6, 19, 36, 53].
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